A family of supermodular Nash mechanisms implementing Lindahl allocations

Yan Chen

Economic Theory, 2002, vol. 19, issue 4, 773-790

Abstract: We present a family of mechanisms which implement Lindahl allocations in Nash equilibrium. With quasilinear utility functions this family of mechanisms are supermodular games, which implies that they converge to Nash equilibrium under a wide class of learning dynamics.

Keywords: Public goods mechanisms; Supermodular games. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 D83 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-02-06
Note: Received: April 27, 2000; revised version: January 16, 2001
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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