Regular type distributions in mechanism design and $$\rho $$ -concavity
Christian Ewerhart
Economic Theory, 2013, vol. 53, issue 3, 603 pages
Abstract:
Some of the best-known results in mechanism design depend critically on Myerson’s (Math Oper Res 6:58–73, 1981 ) regularity condition. For example, the second-price auction with reserve price is revenue maximizing only if the type distribution is regular. This paper offers two main findings. First, a new interpretation of regularity is developed—similar to that of a monotone hazard rate—in terms of being the next to fail. Second, using expanded concepts of concavity, a tight sufficient condition is obtained for a density to define a regular distribution. New examples of regular distributions are identified. Applications are discussed. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2013
Keywords: Virtual valuation; Regularity; Generalized concavity; Prékopa–Borell theorem; Mechanism design; D82; D44; D86; C16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (18)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:53:y:2013:i:3:p:591-603
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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-012-0705-3
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