Individual upper semicontinuity and subgame perfect $$\epsilon $$ ϵ -equilibria in games with almost perfect information

János Flesch (), P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Jasmine Maes () and Arkadi Predtetchinski ()
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János Flesch: Maastricht University
Jasmine Maes: Maastricht University
Arkadi Predtetchinski: Maastricht University

Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 73, issue 2, No 15, 695-719

Abstract: Abstract We study games with almost perfect information and an infinite time horizon. In such games, at each stage, the players simultaneously choose actions from finite action sets, knowing the actions chosen at all previous stages. The payoff of each player is a function of all actions chosen during the game. We define and examine the new condition of individual upper semicontinuity on the payoff functions, which is weaker than upper semicontinuity. We prove that a game with individual upper semicontinuous payoff functions admits a subgame perfect $$\epsilon $$ ϵ -equilibrium for every $$\epsilon >0$$ ϵ > 0 , in eventually pure strategy profiles.

Keywords: Almost perfect information; Infinite game; Subgame perfect $$\epsilon $$ ϵ -equilibrium; Individual upper semicontinuity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C65 C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-019-01201-y

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