The median rule in judgement aggregation

Klaus Nehring () and Marcus Pivato
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Klaus Nehring: UC Davis

Economic Theory, 2022, vol. 73, issue 4, No 9, 1100 pages

Abstract: Abstract A judgement aggregation rule takes the views of a collection of voters over a set of interconnected issues and yields a logically consistent collective view. The median rule is a judgement aggregation rule that selects the logically consistent view which minimizes the average distance to the views of the voters (where the “distance” between two views is the number of issues on which they disagree). In the special case of preference aggregation, this is called the Kemeny rule. We show that, under appropriate regularity conditions, the median rule is the unique judgement aggregation rule which satisfies three axioms: Ensemble Supermajority Efficiency, Reinforcement, and Continuity. Our analysis covers aggregation problems in which the consistency restrictions on input and output judgements may differ. We also allow for issues to be weighted, and provide numerous examples in which issue weights arise naturally.

Keywords: Judgement aggregation; Majoritarian; Reinforcement; Consistency; Median (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00199-021-01348-7

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