Momentum in contests and its underlying behavioral mechanisms

Greg Kubitz (), Lionel Page () and Hao Wan ()
Additional contact information
Greg Kubitz: Queensland University of Technology
Lionel Page: University of Queensland
Hao Wan: University of Queensland

Economic Theory, 2025, vol. 79, issue 1, No 9, 340 pages

Abstract: Abstract We investigate the existence and nature of momentum in performance in contests and whether momentum arises for reasons in part unrelated to rational strategies in contests. To address this question, we look at a setting where strategic considerations should not generate momentum: a sequence of two rounds of independent contests. We show that if we relax the assumption of payoff maximizing agents, positive momentum (success tends to be followed by more success) or negative momentum (success tends to be followed by less success) can arise through several behavioral mechanisms that have, until now, not been widely considered in the literature. We examine these predictions in an experiment. Using random variations in the participants’ winning chances in a first contest to identify the causal effect of success on later performance, we find that a positive momentum exists. Using several experimental conditions which modulate the effect of the different possible mechanisms, we find that the pattern of momentum is most compatible with players having adaptive preferences, whereby they may gain or lose interest in the second contest after respectively winning or losing the first one. These results suggest that standard models of contests do not fully capture the behavioral dynamics existing in competitive settings.

Keywords: Psychological momentum; Adaptive preferences; Regret; Loss aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 C91 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s00199-024-01557-w Abstract (text/html)
Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:joecth:v:79:y:2025:i:1:d:10.1007_s00199-024-01557-w

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
http://www.springer. ... eory/journal/199/PS2

DOI: 10.1007/s00199-024-01557-w

Access Statistics for this article

Economic Theory is currently edited by Nichoals Yanneils

More articles in Economic Theory from Springer, Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().