Strong equilibria in claim games corresponding to convex games

Joaquín Sánchez-Soriano, Stef Tijs, Ana Meca-Martínez and I. García-Jurando
Additional contact information
Stef Tijs: Department of Econometrics, Tilburg University, P.O. Box 90153, LE Tilburg, The Netherlands
Ana Meca-Martínez: Department of Statistics and OR, Faculty of Sciences, University of Alicante, San Vicente del Raspeig, 03071 Alicante, Spain
I. García-Jurando: Department of Statistics and OR, University of Santiago de Compostela, 15706, Santiago de Compostela, Spain

International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 27, issue 2, 217 pages

Abstract: This paper deals with a specific aspect of the problem of coalition formation in a situation described by a TU-game. First, we define a very simple normal form game which models the process of coalition formation. To define the payoff functions of the players we use an allocation rule for TU-games. The main objective of this paper is ascertain what conditions of the allocation rule lead to the grand coalition being a strong equilibrium of the normal form game, when the original TU-game is convex.

Keywords: Coalition; formation; ·; normal; form; game; ·; convex; TV-game; ·; strong; equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-08-31
Note: Received January 1996/Revised version December 1996/Final version May 1997
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