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Finitely additive stochastic games with Borel measurable payoffs

A. Maitra and W. Sudderth
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A. Maitra: University of Minnesota, School of Statistics, 270 Vincent Hall, 206 Church Street S.E., Minneapolis, MN 55455-8868, USA
W. Sudderth: University of Minnesota, School of Statistics, 270 Vincent Hall, 206 Church Street S.E., Minneapolis, MN 55455-8868, USA

International Journal of Game Theory, 1998, vol. 27, issue 2, 257-267

Abstract: We prove that a two-person, zero-sum stochastic game with arbitrary state and action spaces, a finitely additive law of motion and a bounded Borel measurable payoff has a value.

Keywords: Two-person; ·; zero-sum; stochastic; game; ·; finitely; additive; strategy; ·; perfect; information; game; ·; Borel; measurable (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-08-31
Note: Received December 1996/Final version November 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (19)

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