Information, interaction and memory
Virginie Masson
International Journal of Game Theory, 2015, vol. 44, issue 4, 1015-1032
Abstract:
This paper extends previous work on evolutionary games by introducing non-trivial memory into a model where information flows and interactions are captured using networks, as in Alós-Ferrer and Weidenholzer (J Econ Theory 143:251–274, 2008 ). We consider two-player $$K \times K$$ K × K coordination games and analyze best response dynamics as well as imitation dynamics. We show that for any arbitrary information network, including those with asymmetric information exchanges, the introduction of non-trivial memory corroborates the results of previous studies: with best response, agents select the $$\frac{1}{2}$$ 1 2 -dominant strategy while imitators favor efficiency. Furthermore, we expose the sensitivity of the efficiency results to the interaction patterns. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2015
Keywords: Contagion; Networks; Coordination games; Best response; Imitation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:jogath:v:44:y:2015:i:4:p:1015-1032
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-015-0463-0
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