Nested Tullock contests with nonmonotone prizes

Jingfeng Lu, Zhewei Wang () and Lixue Zhou ()
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Zhewei Wang: Shandong University
Lixue Zhou: Shandong University

International Journal of Game Theory, 2023, vol. 52, issue 1, No 12, 303-332

Abstract: Abstract This paper demonstrates the possibility of a symmetric “binary-action mixed-strategy equilibrium” in the nested Tullock contest model (Clark and Riis in Public Choice 87:177–184, 1996; Eur J Polit Econ 14(4):605–625, 1998b) with multiple nonmonotone prizes. In this symmetric equilibrium, every player adopts the same mixed strategy: each exerts zero effort with some probability and a constant positive effort otherwise. This new type of equilibrium can coexist with the pure-strategy equilibria established in the literature; it may exist even when those pure-strategy equilibria do not. The coexisting (mixed and pure-strategy) equilibria may induce different levels of effort supply.

Keywords: Tullock contests; Multiple prizes; Binary-action; Mixed-strategy equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-022-00820-5

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