Submixing and shift-invariant stochastic games

Hugo Gimbert and Edon Kelmendi ()
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Hugo Gimbert: CNRS, LaBRI, Université de Bordeaux
Edon Kelmendi: Queen Mary University of London

International Journal of Game Theory, 2023, vol. 52, issue 4, No 9, 1179-1214

Abstract: Abstract We study optimal strategies in two-player stochastic games that are played on a finite graph, equipped with a general payoff function. The existence of optimal strategies that do not make use of memory and randomisation is a desirable property that vastly simplifies the algorithmic analysis of such games. Our main theorem gives a sufficient condition for the maximizer to possess such a simple optimal strategy. The condition is imposed on the payoff function, saying the payoff does not depend on any finite prefix (shift-invariant) and combining two trajectories does not give higher payoff than the payoff of the parts (submixing). The core technical property that enables the proof of the main theorem is that of the existence of $$\epsilon$$ ϵ -subgame-perfect strategies when the payoff function is shift-invariant. Furthermore, the same techniques can be used to prove a finite-memory transfer-type theorem: namely that for shift-invariant and submixing payoff functions, the existence of optimal finite-memory strategies in one-player games for the minimizer implies the existence of the same in two-player games. We show that numerous classical payoff functions are submixing and shift-invariant.

Keywords: Stochastic games; Half positional; Epsilon subgame perfect strategies; Finite memory optimal strategies; Shift-invariant; Submixing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00860-5

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