Best-response equilibrium: an equilibrium in finitely additive mixed strategies

Igal Milchtaich ()
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Igal Milchtaich: Bar-Ilan University

International Journal of Game Theory, 2023, vol. 52, issue 4, No 13, 1317-1334

Abstract: Abstract A generalization of mixed strategy equilibrium is proposed, where mixed strategies need only be finitely additive and payoff functions are not required to be integrable or bounded. This notion of best-response equilibrium is based on an extension of the idea that an equilibrium strategy is supported in the player’s set of best-response actions, but is applicable also when no best-response actions exist. It yields simple, natural equilibria in a number of well-known games where other kinds of mixed equilibrium are complicated, not compelling or do not exist.

Keywords: Best-response equilibrium; Mixed strategy; Finitely additive probability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/s00182-023-00871-2

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