Core Solutions in Vector-Valued Games
F. R. Fernández,
M. A. Hinojosa and
J. Puerto
Additional contact information
F. R. Fernández: Universidad de Sevilla
M. A. Hinojosa: Universidad Pablo de Olavide
J. Puerto: Universidad de Sevilla
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2002, vol. 112, issue 2, No 5, 360 pages
Abstract:
Abstract In this paper, we analyze core solution concepts for vector-valued cooperative games. In these games, the worth of a coalition is given by a vector rather than by a scalar. Thus, the classical concepts in cooperative game theory have to be revisited and redefined; the important principles of individual and collective rationality must be accommodated; moreover, the sense given to the domination relationship gives rise to two different theories. Although different, we show the areas which they share. This analysis permits us to propose a common solution concept that is analogous to the core for scalar cooperative games.
Keywords: Game theory; multicriteria games; solution concepts; core (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1013606007132
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