Equilibria of the Games in Choice Form

Anton Stefanescu (), Massimiliano Ferrara () and Maria Viorica Stefanescu ()
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Anton Stefanescu: University of Bucharest
Maria Viorica Stefanescu: Academy of Economic Studies

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 2012, vol. 155, issue 3, No 17, 1060-1072

Abstract: Abstract Equilibrium in choice is a solution-concept for noncooperative games defined in a general framework—the game in choice form. There are two leading ideas of the new definition. One is that the players’ preferences need not be explicitly represented, but earlier accepted solution concepts should be formally derived as particular cases. Secondly, the choice of a player need not be a best reply to the strategy combination of the others, if the choices of the other players are motivated for themselves and a best reply does not exist. It is shown that in the present framework are included classical models of game theory, and the new concept extends various known noncooperative solutions. The main technical results of the paper concern the existence of the equilibrium in choice. As particular cases, known results on the existence of classical solutions are found. Thus, our approach can be also seen as a general method for proving the existence of different solutions for noncooperative games.

Keywords: Noncooperative games; Equilibrium; Choice form (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1007/s10957-012-0093-7

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