Limit Consistent Solutions in Noncooperative Games

A. Perea y Monsuwé and Hans Peters
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A. Perea y Monsuwé: Autònoma University

Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 1998, vol. 98, issue 1, No 7, 109-129

Abstract: Abstract Strong and limit consistency in finite noncooperative games are studied. A solution is called strongly consistent if it is both consistent and conversely consistent (Ref. 1). We provide sufficient conditions on one-person behavior such that a strongly consistent solution is nonempty. We introduce limit consistency for normal form games and extensive form games. Roughly, this means that the solution can be approximated by strongly consistent solutions. We then show that the perfect and proper equilibrium correspondences in normal form games, as well as the weakly perfect and sequential equilibrium correspondences for extensive form games, are limit consistent.

Keywords: Noncooperative games; consistency; Nash equilibrium refinements; extensive form games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998
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DOI: 10.1023/A:1022688931144

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