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Theoretical Foundations of ESG Strategy

Jianrong Wang ()
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Jianrong Wang: East China Normal University, Asia Europe Business School, Shanghai International School of Chief Technology Officer

Chapter 3 in ESG Strategies and Financial Markets, 2026, pp 45-52 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter develops an integrative theoretical foundation for Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) strategy within corporate finance. It begins by tracing the intellectual transition from the traditional logic of profit maximization toward a broader concept of sustainable value creation. Classical finance theories—agency theory, contract design, and market discipline—remain necessary but insufficient when firms operate amid externalities, systemic risk, and stakeholder interdependence. ESG strategy operationalizes profit maximization under modern constraints by expanding the scope of priced risks, relevant assets, and enforceable contracts. Defined as the systematic integration of environmental, social, and governance considerations into corporate purpose, capital allocation, and performance measurement, ESG connects firm behavior to long-term financial materiality. The conceptual section distinguishes ESG from corporate social responsibility, sustainability, and responsible business by emphasizing investor-relevant metrics that link operating practices to risk, return, and governance. It frames ESG as a multi-level construct: macro institutions and regulation define incentives; industry networks transmit norms and risks; firm-level governance and contracting transform stakeholder relations into measurable outcomes. Four complementary value-creation logics—risk mitigation, efficiency, innovation, and legitimacy—jointly explain how ESG can enhance both cash flows and discount rates. Economic theories clarify the mechanisms. Agency theory assigns clear decision rights and risk-adjusted incentives for environmental and social performance. Stakeholder and relational-contracting theories show how ESG stabilizes cooperation and reduces opportunism under incomplete contracts Transaction-cost economics explains boundary choices by showing how firms bring high-hazard or high-externality activities in-house to reduce risk and coordination costs. Information economics and signaling theory connect credible disclosure, independent assurance, and the use of objective, auditable contract terms to reduced financing costs and stronger market credibility. Public-economics reasoning situates ESG within regulatory architectures that price externalities and shape private incentives. Strategic-management theories extend the framework: the resource-based view and dynamic capabilities explain how ESG competencies generate durable advantage through learning, data, and process reconfiguration. Industry-structure and non-market perspectives describe how firms influence competitive rules and legitimacy norms. Finance theory closes the loop by showing how ESG performance is priced in capital markets through systematic-risk exposure, information effects, and behavioral investor preferences. The chapter concludes with an integrative ESG strategy framework linking inputs, processes, and outputs across governance, capital budgeting, and disclosure systems. ESG is ultimately conceptualized as disciplined capital allocation under uncertainty, where credible measurement, adaptive capability, and financial materiality convert sustainability commitments into long-term economic advantage.

Date: 2026
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:mgmchp:978-981-95-5620-5_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-95-5620-5_3

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