Scoring rules: A cooperative game-theoretic approach

Iñaki García, Esther Gutiérrez and Emilio Calvo Ramón ()
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Iñaki García: Departamento de Economi´a Aplicada, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del Pai´s Vasco-Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre 83, E-48015 Bilbao, Spain
Esther Gutiérrez: Departamento de Economi´a Aplicada, Facultad de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales, Universidad del Pai´s Vasco-Euskal Herriko Unibertsitatea, Avenida Lehendakari Aguirre 83, E-48015 Bilbao, Spain

Social Choice and Welfare, 1999, vol. 16, issue 3, 512 pages

Abstract: In this work we define the game of the alternatives for each preference profile, and establish relations between scoring rules and cooperative solution concepts for that game, such as the family of semivalues and the family of least square values.

Date: 1999-05-11
Note: Received: 17 March 1997/Accepted: 12 May 1998
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