A geometric examination of Kemeny's rule

Donald G. Saari () and Vincent Merlin ()
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Donald G. Saari: Department of Mathematics, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208-2730 USA

Social Choice and Welfare, 2000, vol. 17, issue 3, 403-438

Abstract: By using geometry, a fairly complete analysis of Kemeny's rule (KR) is obtained. It is shown that the Borda Count (BC) always ranks the KR winner above the KR loser, and, conversely, KR always ranks the BC winner above the BC loser. Such KR relationships fail to hold for other positional methods. The geometric reasons why KR enjoys remarkably consistent election rankings as candidates are added or dropped are explained. The power of this KR consistency is demonstrated by comparing KR and BC outcomes. But KR's consistency carries a heavy cost; it requires KR to partially dismiss the crucial "individual rationality of voters" assumption.

Date: 2000-05-02
Note: Received: 5 February 1998/Accepted: 26 May 1999
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