Dividing resources by flexible majority rules

Hans Gersbach

Social Choice and Welfare, 2004, vol. 23, issue 2, 295-308

Abstract: We examine the division of resources among individuals by flexible majority rules where the majority necessary to adopt a proposal depends on the proposal itself. For instance, the size of the majority may increase with the maximal difference between the shares individuals receive. For large discount factors such rules imply an efficient and even distribution of resources. For low discount factors flexible majority rules supplemented by specific agenda-planning rules such as agenda rights for the opposition guarantee envy-free distribution. Uncertainty about discount rates can make it easier to achieve efficient and envy-free allocations. Copyright Springer-Verlag 2004

Date: 2004
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-004-0314-6

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