Generalized Condorcet winners

Aaron Meyers (), Michael Orrison (), Jennifer Townsend (), Sarah Wolff () and Angela Wu ()

Social Choice and Welfare, 2014, vol. 43, issue 1, 27 pages

Abstract: In an election, a Condorcet winner is a candidate who would win every two-candidate subelection against any of the other candidates. In this paper, we extend the idea of a Condorcet winner to subelections consisting of three or more candidates. We then examine some of the relationships between the resulting generalized Condorect winners. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Date: 2014
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-013-0765-8

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