Social choice without the Pareto principle under weak independence

Ceyhun Coban () and Remzi Sanver

Social Choice and Welfare, 2014, vol. 43, issue 4, 953-961

Abstract: We show that the class of social welfare functions that satisfy a weak independence condition identified by Campbell (J Econ 12:259–272, 1976 ) and Baigent (J Econ 47(4):407–411, 1987 ) is fairly rich and freed of a power concentration on a single individual. This positive result prevails when a weak Pareto condition is imposed. Moreover, under weak independence, an impossibility of the Wilson (J Econ 5:478–486, 1972 ) type vanishes. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2014

Date: 2014
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Working Paper: Social Choice without the Pareto Principle under Weak Independence (2009)
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-014-0812-0

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