Topological aggregation, the twin paradox and the No Show paradox

Guillaume Chèze ()
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Guillaume Chèze: Université Paul Sabatier

Social Choice and Welfare, 2017, vol. 48, issue 4, No 2, 707-715

Abstract: Abstract Consider the framework of topological aggregation introduced by Chichilnisky (Adv Math 37(2):165–176, 1980). We prove that in this framework the twin paradox and the No Show paradox cannot be avoided. Anonymity and unanimity are not needed to obtain these results.

Keywords: Social Preference; Vote Rule; Aggregation Rule; Condorcet Winner; Convexity Condition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-017-1032-1

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