An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation

Justin Kruger and Remzi Sanver
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Justin Kruger: Université Paris-Dauphine, Université PSL, CNRS, LAMSADE

Social Choice and Welfare, 2021, vol. 57, issue 3, No 3, 535-555

Abstract: Abstract In a world where voters not only rank the alternatives but also qualify them as “approved” or “disapproved”, we observe that majoritarianism in preferences and majoritarianism in approvals are logically incompatible. We show that this observation generalises to the following result: every aggregation rule that respects unanimity and decomposes the aggregation of preferences and approvals is dictatorial. Our result implies an incompatibility between ordinal and evaluative approaches to social choice theory under 2 weak assumptions: respect for unanimity and independence of evaluation of each alternative. We describe possibilities when the latter assumption is relaxed. On the other hand, our impossibility generalises to the case where there are more than the two evaluative levels of “approved” and “disapproved”.

Date: 2021
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-021-01327-w

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