Quota implementation in assignment games

Xu Lang () and Jiahui Li ()
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Xu Lang: Shandong University
Jiahui Li: Zhejiang University of Finance and Economics

Social Choice and Welfare, 2025, vol. 65, issue 3, No 7, 675-699

Abstract: Abstract We study the implementability of quota policies in assignment games with constraints, where the planner can set a quota system before the allocation of resources. The distributional constraint specifies demand floors for subgroups of agents. In addition, the planner contends with a group influence constraint, where a larger group of agents exercises more significant influence on a quota policy. We completely characterize the set of all implementable quota systems and provide a game-theoretic interpretation for the implementability condition. We also characterize the extreme points of the polytope defined by the implementable demand floor quotas, and study optimal demand floors in a class of two-stage quota-setting games.

Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1007/s00355-025-01589-8

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