Introduction

Dan S. Felsenthal () and Hannu Nurmi ()
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Dan S. Felsenthal: University of Haifa
Hannu Nurmi: University of Turku

Chapter Chapter 1 in Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, 2018, pp 1-6 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Voting is a common way to resolve disagreements regarding policies to be adopted or candidates to be chosen for various positions and is therefore a necessary ingredient of democratic government. Yet there are numerous voting rules that differ from each other in processing the ballots into voting results. In other words, it is possible that for a given set of voters having a fixed distribution of preferences among the competing alternatives, one would obtain the election of a different alternative as a result of using a different voting rule. We focus on the most obvious desiderata associated with voting procedures, viz., the avoidance of paradoxical outcomes.

Keywords: Voting procedures; Berlin versus Bonn vote; Procedure–dependence of voting outcomes; Voting system desiderata (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spbchp:978-3-319-74033-1_1

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1_1

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