Voting Paradoxes

Dan S. Felsenthal () and Hannu Nurmi ()
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Dan S. Felsenthal: University of Haifa
Hannu Nurmi: University of Turku

Chapter Chapter 2 in Voting Procedures for Electing a Single Candidate, 2018, pp 7-14 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Voting paradoxes pertaining to the election of a single winner are introduced. The paradoxes are divided into five simple paradoxes and eight conditional ones. The simple paradoxes are paradoxes where the relevant data lead to a ‘surprising’ and arguably undesirable outcome, whereas the conditional paradoxes are ones where the change in one relevant datum while holding constant the other relevant data leads to a ‘surprising’ and arguably undesirable outcome.

Keywords: Simple voting paradoxes; Conditional voting paradoxes (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spbchp:978-3-319-74033-1_2

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-74033-1_2

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