The Risks of Resale Price Maintenance Prohibition for the Effectiveness of Inter-Brand Competition

Dieter Ahlert () and Benjamin Schefer ()
Additional contact information
Dieter Ahlert: University of Münster
Benjamin Schefer: University of Münster

Chapter Chapter 3 in Vertical Price Coordination and Brand Care, 2013, pp 19-32 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The conclusion to be drawn from the above statements is that the preservation of supply diversity by protecting strong brands and the expansion of diversity by protecting investments in innovation—given the lack of State protection mechanisms—necessarily requires freedom to take action oneself to regulate internal relationships in value system. However, the strict prohibition of every form of vertical price and brand care largely cancels out this freedom. Undisputedly regarded as evident today is the fact that no general increase in welfare is achieved as a result. On the contrary, the effectiveness of competition between the major brands is seriously endangered. This evidence is examined once again systematically in this section.

Keywords: Consumer Welfare; Competition Authority; Resale Price Maintenance; Strong Brand; Vertical Restraint (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:spbrcp:978-3-642-35570-7_3

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783642355707

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-35570-7_3

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in SpringerBriefs in Business from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().