CTBT Negotiations and the Split-the-Difference Principle

Mordechai Melamud () and Rudolf Schuessler ()
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Mordechai Melamud: CTBTO - Retired, Freelance Researcher
Rudolf Schuessler: University of Bayreuth, Department of Philosophy

Chapter Chapter 6 in Focal Points in Negotiation, 2019, pp 125-148 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter discusses the negotiations that led to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The treaty includes provisions on potential testsite inspections. The authors show that focality and salience played a role at multiple levels in the negotiations concerning inspections. Many of the positions initially put forth by parties to the negotiations were salient. Moreover, as negotiations progressed, two of these acquired particular prominence: a simple majority (50%) and two-thirds majority. In the end, the number agreed upon was the middle between these two solutions, a principle that in itself can be seen as a focal point solution that respects the moral plausibility of the outcome.

Keywords: Nuclear test ban; Onsite inspections; Focal points; Voting thresholds (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-030-27901-1_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-27901-1_6

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