Cheap Talk Games

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Chapter Chapter 13 in Game Theory, 2023, pp 409-434 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter, we explore a class of signaling games where the sender incurs no costs in sending different messages. Unlike in the previous chapter, where messages were costly, such as acquiring years of education, we now consider costless messages, often known as “cheap talk.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-37574-3_13

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