Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

Ana Espinola-Arredondo and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Chapter Chapter 8 in Game Theory, 2023, pp 253-279 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract More often than not, players interact in games where at least one of them is uninformed about some relevant information, such as its rival’s production costs in an oligopoly market or the available stock in a common pool resource (e.g., fishing grounds, forests, and aquifers). In other games, all players are uninformed about some piece of information, such as auctions where every bidder privately observes her valuation for the object on sale but does not observe the valuation that other bidders assign to the object.

Date: 2023
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-37574-3_8

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