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Incentives

James O. Fiet (jamesofiet@me.com)
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James O. Fiet: University of Louisville

Chapter Chapter 45 in The Theoretical Logic of Strategy, 2025, pp 223-225 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Principles and agents, according to agency theorytheory, and workers and management, even shareholdersshareholders and managers, are likely to have different goals based on their self-interestsself-interests.

Date: 2025
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-031-79014-0_45

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-031-79014-0_45

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