On the Existence and Uniqueness of Pure Nash Equilibrium in Rent-Seeking Games

Ferenc Szidarovszky and Koji Okuguchi
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Ferenc Szidarovszky: University of Arizona
Koji Okuguchi: Nanzan University

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, 1997, pp 271-276 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The existence of a unique non-symmetric pure Nash equilibrium is proved for rent-seeking games under the assumption that the production functions of the agents for lotteries are twice differentiate, strictly increasing, and concave. It is also proved that at the equilibrium each agent has nonnegative expected net rent.

Keywords: C72; D43; L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1997
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79182-9_16

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_16

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