Risk-averse rent seeking with shared rents

Neil Vousden and Ngo Long

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, 2008, pp 293-307 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract The theory of rent-seeking behaviour has advanced in many directions since the pioneering contributions by (1967), (1974), and (1975). Perhaps because of the early preoccupation with the social costs of monopoly, the literature has tended to emphasise contests in which the ‘winner takes all’ (e.g. (1980), 1984, (1984), (1984) and (1987). This approach is appropriate when agents compete for a monopoly rent, a government contract or any other indivisible transfer. There is however another important case, relatively neglected in the literature, in which agents expend resources competing for a share of a divisible rent rather than for the whole of an indivisible rent. It is this type of rent seeking which is the subject of the present paper.

Date: 2008
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Journal Article: Risk-Averse Rent Seeking with Shared Rents (1987)
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_18

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