Strategic restraint in contests

Gil S. Epstein and Shmuel Nitzan
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Gil S. Epstein: Bar-Ilan University

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, 2002, pp 421-430 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Economic policy is modelled as the outcome of a (political) game between two interest groups. The possible ex-post (realized) outcomes in the game correspond to the proposed policies. In the literature policy proposals are exogenous. We extend such games by allowing the endogenous determination of the proposed policies. In a first stage the groups decide which policy to lobby for and then, in a second stage, engage in a contest over the proposed policies. Our main result is that competition over endogenously determined policies induces strategic restraint that reduces polarization and, in turn, wasteful lobbying activities.

Keywords: Interest groups; Endogenous lobbying targets; Voluntary restraint; Polarization; Voluntary restraint (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002
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Journal Article: Strategic restraint in contests (2004)
Working Paper: Strategic Restraint in Contests (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79182-9_29

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_29

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