Competition over More Than One Prize

Derek J. Clark and Christian Rus
Additional contact information
Derek J. Clark: NFH, University of Tromsø
Christian Rus: Foundation for Research in Economics and Business Administration (SNF)

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, 2008, pp 601-614 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In many situations, competition may be used as a means for providing incentives. Suppose that a firm is restricted to pay the same wage to all workers who have the same job (as is broadly the case for lecturers at Norwegian universities, for example). This situation may arise due to a union-imposed restriction, or it may be voluntary. In order to provide an incentive to make the workers exert extra effort without breaking the uniform wage restriction, the firm may instigate a contest among workers with in-kind prizes such as paid leave, a family holiday, or promotion. Those who exert the most effort may, on the basis of past experience for example, expect to win the prizes, but losers cannot have their effort refunded; that “bids” are sunk makes the allpay auction a theoretical construct which can be used to model this situation.

Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79182-9_44

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783540791829

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_44

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().