Rent-seeking with asymmetric valuations

Kofi O. Nti
Additional contact information
Kofi O. Nti: Penn State University

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 1, 1999, pp 149-164 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper analyzes Tullock’s rent-seeking game with asymmetric valuations for a variable range of the returns to scale parameter. A necessary and sufficient condition for a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium is established. Equilibrium effort and expected profits are determined and subjected-to comparative statics analysis. Increasing the underdog’s valuation induces both players to increase their efforts. Increasing the favorite’s valuation increases his effort but decreases the effort of the underdog. Expected profits increase with a player’s valuation but decreases with the valuation of the competitor. The impact of the returns to scale parameter is also analyzed.

Date: 1999
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79182-9_9

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783540791829

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79182-9_9

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().