Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies

Aaron S. Edlin and Joseph Stiglitz
Additional contact information
Aaron S. Edlin: University of California

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, 2008, pp 609-620 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Managerial theories of the firm have a long and controversial history, beginning perhaps with Adolf A. Berle, Jr. and Gardiner C. Means’s classic (1932) study. Such theories postulated that managers had considerable discretion running corporations and exercised it to pursue objectives other than maximizing shareholder market value.

Date: 2008
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies (1995)
Working Paper: Discouraging Rivals: Managerial Rent-Seeking and Economic Inefficiencies (1992)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-540-79247-5_36

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783540792475

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_36

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Books from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().