Efficient Status Seeking: Externalities, and the Evolution of Status Games

Roger Congleton

A chapter in 40 Years of Research on Rent Seeking 2, 1989, pp 697-712 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Status-seeking games are games in which an individual’s utility is determined by his relative expenditure on status-seeking activities rather than his absolute consumption. There are a number of parallels between status-seeking and rent-seeking activities, for example, a tendency for Pareto excessive private investment. However, many status-seeking activities differ from rent- seeking activities insofar as they generate significant benefits to individuals not actively involved in the game. Given an array of more or less productive status-seeking games, it is likely that relatively efficient status conferring mechanisms will tend to displace less efficient ones.

Date: 1989
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-79247-5_42

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