Crowdsourcing and Schelling’s Theory of Self-Command

Eric Anderson ()

Chapter Chapter 6 in Social Media Marketing, 2010, pp 87-100 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Coordination games require a degree of self-restraint; marketers face a natural temptation to defect in the interests of short-term gains. Thomas Schelling’s concept of self-command provides a potential antidote; a player compels themselves to cooperate by setting conditions that make defection costly or difficult. Successful self-command often involves enlisting a group in the enforcement of norms; brands have done so by opening themselves up to consumer feedback on blogs, but the more dramatic use of self-command occurs in the phenomenon known as crowdsourcing. In crowdsourcing, marketers solicit direct collaboration with consumers in identifying and developing brand assets, customer service features, and even products. Crowdsourcing must operate within certain rules of engagement in order to be succcessful, but it has the potential to be transformative in marketer-consumer relationships.

Keywords: Social Media; Free Rider; Coordination Game; Customer Experience; Stag Hunt (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-3-642-13299-5_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-13299-5_6

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