 The Building Blocks to Design Robust and Effective Capital RegulationA K M Kamrul Hasan () and
Yasushi Suzuki
Chapter Chapter 8 in Implementation of Basel Accords in Bangladesh, 2021, pp 173-186 from Springer Abstract: Abstract So far, we document that the realities of Bangladeshi banking sector between 2009 and 2018 are an ill-by-product of multiple institutional failures. To analyze the issue more specifically, we shed light on ECAIs regulations and sub-debt regulations which are discussed in Chapters 4–6 whereas Chapter 7 provides multiple cases of bank distress. At this point, the crucial question is how to build a robust and effective capital regulation for emerging economies like Bangladesh. Based on our findings and analysis, we develop several institutional reform policies for financial regulators to fix the banking sector malaise from institutional perspective. The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 8.2 offers the detailed reform policies for ensuring the ECAIs rating quality based on best practices in the US. Section 8.3 presents the detailed reform policy prescriptions for tackling the sub-debt trap and building a resilient capital from Basel Accord philosophy. Section 8.4 is the concluding remarks. Date: 2021 There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sprchp:978-981-16-3472-7_8 Ordering information: This item can be ordered from DOI: 10.1007/978-981-16-3472-7_8 Access Statistics for this chapter More chapters in Springer Books from Springer |
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