First-Price Auctions: Extensions

Pak-Sing Choi and Felix Munoz-Garcia

Chapter 3 in Auction Theory, 2021, pp 63-123 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter applies the analysis of equilibrium bidding behavior in first-price auctions from Chap. 2 to answer different questions. In Exercise 3.1, we measure the seller’s expected revenue in this auction format when bidders draw their valuations from a generic distribution function and then evaluate this expected revenue in the case that bidders’ valuations are uniformly distributed.

Keywords: Aggressive bids; Marginal gain; Marginal loss; Sequential first-price auction; Profit margin; Sales volume; Participation; Concave utility function; Mixed strategy bidding profile; Expected payment; Parametric example; L’Hopital’s rule; Asymmetrically distributed valuations; Backward induction; Subgame; Subgame perfect equilibrium; First-order stochastic dominance; Unconstrained bidder; Profitable deviation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-030-69575-0_3

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783030695750

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-69575-0_3

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Springer Texts in Business and Economics from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().