Finite Games

Hans Peters

Chapter 13 in Game Theory, 2015, pp 215-249 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter builds on Chap. 3 , where we studied finite two person games—bimatrix games. (Re)reading Chap. 3 may serve as a good preparation for the present chapter, which offers a more rigorous treatment of finite games, i.e., games with finitely many players—often two—who have finitely many pure strategies over which they can randomize. We only discuss games with complete information. In the terminology of Chap. 5 , each player has only one type.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Pure Strategy; Good Reply; Strategy Combination; Matrix Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_13

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