Evolutionary Games

Hans Peters

Chapter 15 in Game Theory, 2015, pp 273-288 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter we go deeper into evolutionary game theory. The concepts of evolutionary stable strategy and replicator dynamics, introduced in Chap. 8 , are further explored. It may be helpful to study Chap. 8 first, although the present chapter is largely self-contained.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Mixed Strategy; Pure Strategy; Lyapunov Stability; Payoff Matrix (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_15

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_15

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