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Hans Peters

Chapter 24 in Game Theory, 2015, pp 425-483 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract There are saddlepoint(s) if and only if x ≤ −1.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Pure Strategy; Repeated Game; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Veto Player (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:sptchp:978-3-662-46950-7_24

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_24

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