Noncooperative Games: Extensions

Hans Peters

Chapter 6 in Game Theory, 2015, pp 89-120 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In Chaps. 2 –5 we have studied noncooperative games in which the players have finitely many (pure) strategies. The reason for the finiteness restriction is that in such games special results hold, such as the existence of a value and optimal strategies for two-person zero-sum games, and the existence of a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies for finite nonzero-sum games.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Payoff Function; Reaction Function; Subgame Perfect Equilibrium; Cournot Competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-662-46950-7_6

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