A Game-Theoretic Model for Cross-Plant Prevention in a Chemical Industrial Park

Genserik Reniers () and Yulia Pavlova
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Genserik Reniers: University of Antwerp
Yulia Pavlova: MTT Agrifood Research Finland

Chapter Chapter 4 in Using Game Theory to Improve Safety within Chemical Industrial Parks, 2013, pp 57-71 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter explains the application of the theoretical models of game theory introduced in the previous chapter, within the chemical industry. A domino effects game model for the setting of a chemical industrial park, is defined. Probabilities in games are introduced, and a brief explanation is given on how to solve Bayesian coordination games.

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Dominant Strategy; Coordination Game; Domino Effect; Pure Strategy Equilibrium (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ssrchp:978-1-4471-5052-7_4

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4471-5052-7_4

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