Cooperative Incentives Approach in Case of an MPC with Limited Resources

Genserik Reniers () and Yulia Pavlova
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Genserik Reniers: University of Antwerp
Yulia Pavlova: MTT Agrifood Research Finland

Chapter Chapter 6 in Using Game Theory to Improve Safety within Chemical Industrial Parks, 2013, pp 91-110 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This chapter uses game theory to evaluate different strategic cross-plant precaution collaboration situations. An application of the model is provided and explains how cross-plant precaution in chemical clusters may be enhanced and realized despite limited resources available to the Multi-plant council (MPC).

Keywords: Chemical Plant; Expected Cost; Domino Effect; Full Cooperation; External Incentive (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:ssrchp:978-1-4471-5052-7_6

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DOI: 10.1007/978-1-4471-5052-7_6

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