Combinatorics of Election Scores

Alexander Karpov

A chapter in Evaluating Voting Systems with Probability Models, 2021, pp 347-366 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract This paper presents a novel combinatorial approach for voting rule analysis. Applying reversal symmetry, we introduce a new class of preference profiles and a new representation (bracelet representation) of preference profiles. By applying an impartial, anonymous, and neutral culture model for the case of three alternatives, we obtain precise theoretical values for the number of election scores for the plurality rule, the Kemeny rule, the Borda rule, and the scoring rules in the extreme case.

Date: 2021
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-030-48598-6_15

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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-030-48598-6_15

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