Nash consistent representations

Bezalel Peleg and Hans Peters

Chapter Chapter 3 in Strategic Social Choice, 2010, pp 21-43 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In Chapter 2 we have seen how a constitution of a society or more formally, an effectivity function, and a set of rules that enable the members of the society to exercise their rights simultaneously, i.e., a game form representing the effectivity function, govern the behavior of the members of a (civilized) state. In this chapter we introduce a new element: the preferences of the society members over the social states.1

Keywords: Nash Equilibrium; Topological Space; Social Welfare Function; Game Form; Simple Game (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-13875-1_3

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