The Impact of Group Coherence on the Condorcet Ranking Efficiency of Voting Rules

William V. Gehrlein () and Dominique Lepelley
Additional contact information
William V. Gehrlein: University of Delaware

Chapter Chapter 8 in Electoral Systems, 2012, pp 201-216 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract Recent developments in voting theory, based on both probabilistic and empirical considerations, have led to the conclusion that Condorcet’s paradox should be a rare event in actual election settings with a small number of candidates, as soon as voters display any significant level of group mutual coherence, i.e. as soon as voters tend, in one way or another, to have similar preferences (see e.g. Gehrlein 2011, and for an empirical point of view, Regenwetter et al. 2006). In the light of this conclusion, the Condorcet criterion, which requires that the pairwise majority rule winner (PMRW) – or Condorcet winner – should be elected when such a candidate exists, appears as being very relevant. It is therefore of particular interest to investigate the propensity of common voting rules to be in agreement with pairwise majority rule (PMR) when group coherence is taken into consideration.

Keywords: Vote Rule; Group Coherence; Weak Measure; Condorcet Winner; Plurality Rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:stcchp:978-3-642-20441-8_8

Ordering information: This item can be ordered from
http://www.springer.com/9783642204418

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-642-20441-8_8

Access Statistics for this chapter

More chapters in Studies in Choice and Welfare from Springer
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Sonal Shukla () and Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing ().