Evolution of Preferences, Social Norms, and Decision Rules

Suren Basov

Chapter Chapter 3 in Social Norms, Bounded Rationality and Optimal Contracts, 2016, pp 35-56 from Springer

Abstract: Abstract In this chapter I suggest some general thoughts on a way one can approach the problem of modelling coevolution of decision rules, preferences and social norms.

Keywords: Social Norm; Inclusive Fitness; Replicator Dynamic; Stable Steady State; Strategy Profile (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:spr:steccp:978-981-10-1041-5_3

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DOI: 10.1007/978-981-10-1041-5_3

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